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"Are You Going To Arraign His Whole Life?":*
How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due

Process Clause
Louis M. Natali, Jr.** & R. Stephen Stigall***

I. INTRODUCTION

Congress promulgated Rules 413,1 414,2 and 415' of the Federal
Rules of Evidence pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994. 4 The new rules, which became effective on
'6
July 9, 1995,' require a district court to admit "propensity evidence
Harrison's Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 834, 864 (Old Bailey 1692).
Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A. 1963, La Salle
**
College; L.L.B. 1966, Georgetown University.
*** B.A. 1991, Connecticut College; J.D. 1996, Temple University School of Law.
The authors wish to thank Professors JoAnne A. Epps, Edward D. Ohlbaum, and David A.
Sonenshein for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. The authors
also thank Temple University School of Law for financial support.
1. The relevant portion of Rule 413 provides:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses
of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.
FED. R. EVID. 413(a).
2. The relevant portion of Rule 414 provides:
(a) In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
FED. R. EvID. 414(a).
3. The relevant portion of Rule 415 provides:
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on
a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual
assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another
offense or offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and
may be considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these Rules.
FED. R. EvID. 415(a).
4. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. art. IV,
Rules of Evidence 413-415 (1994) (effective July 9, 1995)).
5. See infra notes 26-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new rules
enactment procedure.
6. Propensity evidence is evidence that an accused or civil defendant committed an
*
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whenever a federal prosecutor or plaintiff offers such evidence in
sexual assault and child molestation cases. 7 The rules are mandatory
in that they state without qualification that propensity evidence is
admissible. Thus, the rules require admission of propensity evidence
without regard to other rules of evidence, particularly the
prejudice/probativeness balancing test set forth in Rule 403.
Recent scholarship suggests that many judges, law professors, and
lawyers strongly oppose the new rules.8 These scholars have
articulated several reasons why Rules 413-415 are invalid. For
example, opponents argue that the new rules undermine the integrity
and rationality of the Federal Rules of Evidence; 9 the new rules are
unnecessary'0 and suffer from significant drafting problems;" the
offense in the past similar to the one with which he is currently charged. The inference
the jury draws from such evidence is that the accused or civil defendant is the type of
person who would commit the offense with which he has been charged. The jury,
therefore, will likely conclude that the accused or defendant did in fact commit the
offense with which he is charged. See David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 336-37 (1995) (outlining jurors'
reasoning in consideration of propensity evidence); James S. Liebman, Proposed
Evidence Rules 413 to 415--Some Problems and Recommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 753, 754-55 (1995) (discussing policy reasons which favor excluding propensity
evidence).
7. See supra notes 1-3 for applicable text of the Rules; see also infra notes 161-62
and accompanying text for further discussion.
8. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Foreword: Do We Really Want to Know the Defendant?,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 11 (1994) (summarizing arguments against Rules 413-415).
9. Liebman, supra note 6, at 755-57. Professor Liebman asserts that the new rules,
by permitting admission of propensity evidence in sexual assault and child molestation
cases, directly contravene Rule 404, which generally proscribes using evidence of
character traits to prove action in conformity therewith. Id. See also James Joseph
Duane, The New FederalRules of Evidence on PriorActs of Accused Sex Offenders: A
Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 111-13 (1994) (arguing that
Rules 413-415 will make Federal Rules of Evidence inconsistent and inexplicable);
Leonard, supra note 6, at 341 (asserting that new rules make evidence law more complex
and serve to detract from its truth-finding purpose).
10. See, e.g., Duane, supra note 9, at 97-106 (emphasizing that evidence law prior to
enactment of new rules adequately addressed Congress's justifications for new rules);
Liebman, supra note 6, at 758-59 (asserting Rule 404(b) adequately treats propensity
evidence).
11. See, e.g., Report of the Judicial Conference on the Admission of Character
Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases (submitted to the Congress in accordance
with section 320935 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub.L. No. 103-322), reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 52 (1995) [hereinafter Judicial
Conference Report] (noting that an overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law
professors, and legal organizations objected to the new rules because of numerous
drafting problems and because the new rules would allow the admittance of prejudicial
evidence); Duane, supra note 9, at 115-22 (asserting that the new rules are ambiguous in
scope and improperly override a number of other Federal Rules of Evidence); Liebman,
supra note 6, at 759-60 (suggesting that the drafters did not intend for the awkward
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process by which Congress enacted the rules was improper; 2 and, the
new rules may3 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. '
Although opponents have offered many reasons for opposing Rules
413-415, one argument against the rules' validity that has not been
specifically articulated in recent literature is that the rules directly
contravene the Due Process Clause 4 of the United States
Constitution. 5 This Article contends that Rules 413-415 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence violate due process: "those 'fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions' and which define 'the community's sense of fair play and
decency."16
In determining that Rules 413-415 violate the Due Process Clause,
this Article first traces the legislative history of Rules 413, 414, and
415.1" This Article then discusses the historic prohibition of admitting
propensity evidence, focusing first on the legal justifications for the
prohibition, and second on propensity evidence's violation of due
process.' 8 This Article next determines that Rules 413-415 violate the
Due Process Clause because they contravene the prohibition of
propensity evidence so deeply embedded in the United States
procedure which results from the language used in the new rules).
12. See, e.g., Duane, supra note 9, at 95-97 (discussing manner in which Congress
enacted Rules 413-415); Liebman, supra note 6, at 757 (noting that Congress did not
subject rules to needed study, Congressional hearings, or consideration by Supreme
Court or its Advisory Committee on Federal Rules); Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar
Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 343, 343-44 (1995) (recommending that ABA oppose Rules 413-415, in part
because of Congress's bypassing Rules Enabling Act procedures).
13. Duane, supra note 9, at 113-15. Professor Duane argues that Rules 413-415 will
have a disproportionate impact on Native Americans because commission of sexual
assault or child molestation is a federal offense only if the act occurs on Native American
land or federal property. Id. at 114. Professor Duane comments that although racially
disparate impact of rules does not, by itself, amount to a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647-50 (1977), Rules 413415 disproportionately target Native Americans and therefore have significant racial
implications. Duane, supra note 9, at 113-15 (commenting on the new rules' shameful
unequal treatment of Native Americans).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. See Liebman, supra note 6, at 757-58 (asserting that the new rules may be
unconstitutional but declining to undertake a comprehensive study of the constitutional
status of the prohibition of propensity evidence).
16. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990) (quoting Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173
(1952)).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
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Constitution. 9 In addition, this Article argues that the rules are
unconstitutional because they require irrational and arbitrary
inferences, 0 and because they completely eviscerate Rules 4032' and
40422 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, thus preventing a
fundamentally fair trial.23 This Article also includes a discussion of
lower court opinions holding that admission of propensity evidence in
trials involving sexual assault and child molestation violates due
process. 24 Finally, this Article concludes that Rules 413-415
represent popular political fads which Congress enacted in order to
satisfy the fears of constituents, without regard to protections afforded
to defendants by the Constitution.25
II. THE ENACTMENT OF RULES 413, 414, AND 415 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

On September 13, 1994, Congress enacted Rules 413, 414, and
415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as part of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("Crime Bill").26 Although
Congress established the rules by enactment of the Crime Bill,
unsuccessful attempts had previously been made in proposing Rules
413-415.27 The rules, originally drafted as part of the Bush

19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See infra note 211 for the text of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of Rules 413415 on Rule 403.
22. See infra notes 66-67 for the pertinent portions of the text of Rule 404 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See infra notes 194-99 and 203-07 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the impact of Rules 413-415 on Rule 404.
2 3. See infra Part IV.C.
24. See infra Part IV.D.
2 5. See infra Part V.
26. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. art. IV.
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, 415 (1994)) (effective July 9, 1995).
27. H.R. 4848, 103d Cong. § 611 (1994); H.R. 4197, 103d Cong. § 211 (1994);
H.R. 4055, 103d Cong. § 307 (1994); H.R. 2872, 103d Cong. § 211 (1993); S. 8, 103d
Cong. § 821 (1993); S. 6, 103d Cong. § 121 (1993); H.R. 688, 103d Cong. § 121
(1993); H.R. 2847, 103d Cong. § 821 (1993); S. 3271, 102d Cong. § 121 (1992); H.R.
5960, 102d Cong. § 121 (1992); H.R. 5218, 102d Cong. § 711 (1992); S. 635, 102d
Cong. § 801 (1991); S. 1151, 102d Cong. § 801 (1991); S. 1335, 102d Cong. § 301
(1991); H.R. 1400, 102d Cong. § 801 (1991); H.R. 3463, 102d Cong. § 1 (1991); S.
472, 102d Cong. § 231 (1991); H.R. 1149, 102d Cong. § 231 (1991).
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Administration's push for violent crime legislation, 28 remained
virtually unchanged in what resulted in the Crime Bill.29
The legislative history reveals several reasons that prompted
Congress to enact Rules 413-415.30 First, sponsors of the House and
Senate bills believed that prosecutors desired similar-offense type
evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases.3 ' Second, the
sponsors expressed a desire to protect the public from rapists and child
molesters,32 whom the sponsors asserted were typically recidivists, by
obtaining more convictions 33 through admitting propensity evidence
without a "protracted legal battle" of whether such evidence is
admissible.34 Third, the sponsors commented that the rules would
bolster the credibility of sexual assault victims in the face of defenses
of consent and false accusation, and bolster the credibility of child
molestation victims whose credibility is often weak in the absence of
28. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Some Comments About Mr. David Karp's Remarks on
Propensity Evidence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37, 37 (1994) [hereinafter Imwinkelried,
Some Comments] (responding to David J. Karp, Senior Counsel to the Office of Policy
Development, United States Department of Justice, who was a primary author of Rules
413-415).
29. See supra note 27 for the various legislative bills proposing Rules 413-415.
Compare 137 CONG. REC. S3212 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (setting forth Rules 413-415
in text of § 801 of S. 635, 102 Cong. (1991)) with Act of Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 320935(a), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 1796, 2135-37 (providing text
of FED. R. EvID. 413, 414, and 415).
30. The legislative history for Rules 413-415 and the views expressed by individual
members of Congress are set forth in a prepared text of an address presented to the
Evidence Section of the Association of American Law Schools [the "AALS"] on January
9, 1993. See generally David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex
Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1994) (reprinting address to
Evidence Section of AALS); see also 140 CONG. REC. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Dole, principal sponsor of rules in Senate) (stating that the address
provides a "detailed account of the views of the legislative sponsors and the
administration concerning the ... reform, and should ... be considered an authoritative
part of its legislative history"); 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Molinari, principle sponsor of rules in House) (same).
3 1. See 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole)
("Ask any prosecutor, and he or she will tell you how important similar-offense evidence
can be.").
32. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari) (noting critical nature of rules in protecting public from rapists and child
molesters).
33. See 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl)
(indicating new rules will result in more convictions).
34. See 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole)
("[W]hen someone is out there committing sex crime after sex crime, committing child
molestation after child molestation, it is this Senator's view that this [propensity]
evidence should be admitted ... without a protracted legal battle over what is admissible
and what is not.").
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corroborating evidence.35 Moreover, the supporters of the rules
suggested that propensity evidence in sexual assault and child
molestation cases is typically relevant, probative, and not outweighed
by any prejudice or adverse effects the evidence may cause.36 Finally,
because sexual assault and child molestation offenses are typically state
crimes, the sponsors desired to cause the states to change their
evidence codes to reflect the federal rules.37
Congress did not enact Rules 413-415 without vigorous dissent.
Several members of Congress voiced strong opposition to the new
rules.3 Arguments against the rules included, among others, that the
rules were highly prejudicial and unconstitutional. 39 For example, in a
scathing criticism of the rules, Representative Hughes remarked:
[T]he proposed rules are not only seriously suspect on
constitutional grounds, but they are extremely bad public
policy. If the primary evidence in a prosecution's case in chief
is evidence of prior acts . . . we would be sinking into the star

chamber procedures that have long been rejected by civilized
societies everywhere ....

This is a question of protecting our

system of justice and fair trials.4°
Also in the House, New York Representative Schumer explicitly
objected to Rules 413-415 on grounds that they violate due process."
Senator Biden, a tough-on-crime drafter of the Crime Bill, adamantly
35. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari) (discussing consent and false accusation defenses in sexual assault cases); 140
CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) (noting defense
of attacking credibility of child-victim in child molestation cases); see also Karp, supra
note 30, at 21 (asserting need to bolster victims' credibility in sexual assault and child
molestation cases).
36. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari); see also Karp, supra note 30, at 20-22, 24 (discussing probative value of
propensity evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases).
37. See 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole)
("[Tlhe Federal Government has a leadership role to play in this area. Once the Federal
rules are amended, it's possible-perhaps even likely-that the States may follow suit
and amend their own rules of evidence as well.")
38. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement inserted
into the record by Rep. Hughes) (noting that rules would raise "very serious
constitutional questions"); 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Schumer) (objecting to Rules 413-415 on grounds that they violate due
process).
40. 140 CONG. REC. H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement inserted into the
record by Rep. Hughes). Rep. Hughes also stated that the use of propensity evidence
resembled the tactics used in the Star Chamber. Id.
41. 140 CONG. REC. H5439-40 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Schumer).
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opposed the new rules as well, 4asserting
that the new rules violate
"every basic tenet of our system. 2
Despite considerable opposition on grounds that the new rules were43
unconstitutional, the opponents acquiesced after lengthy negotiations
with the rules' supporters and enacted the Crime Bill, thereby enacting
Rules 413-415. 44 The rules, however, did not become effective
immediately. Rather, the Crime Bill required the Judicial Conference
of the United States, within 150 days of the rules' enactment, to
prepare and transmit a report to Congress setting forth
recommendations for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to admit
evidence of a defendant's prior sexual assault or child molestation
offenses in sexual assault and child molestation cases.45 The Act
further provided that if the Judicial Conference recommended
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence different from those
Congress enacted, Rules 413-415 nevertheless would become
effective within 150 days after the Judicial Conference transmitted its
recommendations, unless Congress provided otherwise.'
The Judicial Conference submitted its report to Congress on
February 9, 1995. 4' Based on opposition to the rules by the Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, and Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, the Judicial Conference urged Congress to reconsider Rules
413-415.4s For example, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
met in October, 1994, to consider the public's response to the new
rules. 49 The Advisory Committee reported that the majority of judges,
law professors, lawyers, and legal organizations overwhelmingly
opposed Rules 413-415.5° Second Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter's
42. 140 CONG. REC. S 10,277 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden).
43. Jill Zuckman, Negotiators in House Outline Deal on Crime Bill, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 21, 1994, at I (outline of anticrime bill reached after a "night of closed
negotiations that lasted until 6 a.m.").
44. See Duane, supra note 9, at 95-97 (discussing procedure by which opponents
acquiesced to supporters of rules).
45. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 2137 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. art. IV, Rules
of Evidence 413-415 (1994) (effective Jul. 9, 1995)).
46. Id. § 320935(d) (2), 108 Stat. at 2137.
47. Judicial Conference Report, supra note 11, at 51.
48. Id. at 52-53.
49. Id. at 52.
50. Id. See also Richard C. Reuben, Some Judges Oppose Evidence Amendment,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 20-21 (1995) (reporting that judges' concerns over
constitutionality, administrative inconvenience, and fundamental fairness of the
proposed rules led the judges to oppose them).
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remarks in opposition to the new rules were typical: "You can't
convict someone based on their propensity to commit a crime."'"
With the exception of the Department of Justice's dissenting vote in
each committee, the advisory committees unanimously opposed the
new rules. 2 The committees concluded that the new rules would
improperly (1) permit admission of highly prejudicial and unreliable
evidence, (2) cause significant trial delay because the admission of
such evidence would require defendants to contest other alleged
wrongs, and (3) diminish the fundamental and time-honored
protections against admission of propensity evidence developed under
rules and case law.53 Although the Judicial Conference urged
Congress to reconsider Rules 413-415, the Judicial Conference
alternatively recommended that Congress incorporate Rules 413-415
as amendments to Rules 404 and 405 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.54
In addition to the Judicial Conference, the American Bar Association
voiced strong opposition to the new rules.55 In the Criminal Justice
Section's Report to the House of Delegates on Rules 413-415, the
ABA noted that, among others in the legal profession, eleven lawyers,
fifty-six evidence professors, nineteen judges, and twelve
5 1. Junda Woo, Judges Attack Law Easing Rape Evidence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,
1994, at B8.
5 2. Judicial Conference Report, supra note 11, at 53. The Judicial Conference report
emphasized to Congress the highly unusual unanimity of members' opposition to Rules
413-415. Id. The report noted that of the 40 judges, practicing attorneys, and
academics comprising the Standing Committee and Advisory Committees on Evidence,
Criminal, and Civil Rules, all but the representatives of the Department of Justice
opposed Rules 413-415. Id.
53. Id. at 52-53.
54. Id. at 53-57. The Judicial Conference's proposed amendments to Rules 404 and
405, inter alia, would have (1) expressly applied the other rules of evidence to
propensity evidence offered in sexual assault and child molestation cases under the new
rules, (2) allowed the opponent of such propensity evidence to use similar evidence in
rebuttal, (3) expressly subjected propensity evidence to the Rule 403 unfair prejudice
versus probative balance, (4) ensured that the notice provisions of existing Rule 404 are
consistent, (5) removed the special notice provisions of Rules 413-415 in civil cases to
require notice as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (6) permitted the
accused or defendant to offer reputation or opinion evidence after the admission of the
propensity evidence. Id. at 54. See id. at 54-57 for the text of the Judicial Conference's
recommended amendments to Rules 404 and 405 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
accompanied by the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules' Notes explaining the
amendments in detail.
55. See American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of
Delegates, reprinted in 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 343-53 (1995-) [hereinafter A.B.A.
Criminal Justice Section Report](resolving to oppose Rules 413-415 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
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organizations had expressed objection to the new rules to Congress. 6
The ABA concluded that the rules were defective because, inter alia,
they raised due process issues by permitting evidence solely to show
propensity. 7
Notwithstanding the strong opposition to the new rules, Congress
took no action with respect to the Judicial Conference's
recommendation that Congress reconsider Rules 413-415. 58
Moreover, Congress took no action regarding the Judicial
Conference's alternate proposal of incorporating Rules 413-415 into
Rules 404 and 405 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 9 Accordingly,
Rules 413-415 became effective on July 9, 1995.6

III. THE PROHIBITION AGAINST

ADMITrING PROPENSITY
EVIDENCE AS EMBEDDED IN THE CONCEPT

OF DUE PROCESS
A. The TraditionalReasons Against the Use of
PropensityEvidence
The proscription against admitting propensity evidence arose out of
the common law. 6 This is evidenced by the old Uniform Rules of
Evidence, which were drafted in 1948 by the National Conference of
the Commission on Uniform State Laws. Uniform Rule 55 prohibited
admission of prior crimes evidence to prove disposition to commit the
crime charged. 62 As set forth in its comment, Rule 55 expresses,
the generally accepted rule rejecting evidence of another crime
56. Id. at 345. Of the 100 individuals who opposed the rules, 19 cited constitutional
concerns and 58 thought that the rules were unfair. Id. at 346.
57. Id. at 347 (citing McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1993)).
58. Effective Date of Evidence Rules 413, 414, and 415, 1995 United States Order 9524, July 9, 1995, available in WESTLAW, US-Orders database.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) (noting
common law tradition of disallowing admission of propensity evidence to prove action
in conformity therewith).
62. See, e.g., TRIAL EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES, RE-30 (Sol Schreiber et al. eds., rev. ed.
1969) (reprinting the Uniform Rules of Evidence). Rule 55 provided in relevant part:
[E]vidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified
occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or civil
wrong as the basis for an inference that he committed another crime or civil
wrong on another specified occasion but ... such evidence is admissible when
relevant to prove some other material fact including absence of mistake or
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or
identity.
Id. at Appendix A.
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or civil wrong as proof that a person committed a crime or civil
wrong on a specified occasion. The limitation is directed
against the idea that when it is shown that a person committed a
crime on a former occasion there arises an inference that he has
a disposition to commit crime and therefore committed the
crime with which he is now charged.63

The California Evidence Code, a precursor to the Federal Rules, which
went into effect in 1967, similarly reflects a proscription against using
propensity evidence.'
The Federal Rules of Evidence codified the propensity evidence
prohibition in Rule 404.65 Rule 404 provides that evidence of a

person's character or character trait is not admissible to prove that the
person acted in conformity with the person's character or character
trait, except in certain limited circumstances.66 Rule 404 also
proscribes admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.67 However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts is
63. Id.
64. The California Evidence Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, and 1108,
evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances
of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct
on a specified occasion.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact
(such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an
unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in
good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition
to commit such an act.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1996). Significantly, however, the California
Evidence Code, in a sexual offense criminal action, permits admission of an accused's
other sexual offenses if the trial judge does not find that the prejudice of such evidence
outweighs its probative value. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp. 1996).
65. FED. R. EvID. 404.
66. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused.
Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same; ....

Id.
67. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in
relevant part: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
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admissible, if probative of a material issue in a case other than
character, such as to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
68
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Courts and commentators have offered numerous justifications for
the propensity rule, generally noting the highly prejudicial nature of
propensity evidence. 9 For example, courts, reasoning that jurors may
convict an accused because the accused is a "bad person, 70 have
typically excluded propensity evidence on grounds that such evidence
jeopardizes the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence
until proven guilty. 7' The jury, repulsed by evidence of prior "bad
acts," may overlook weaknesses in the prosecution's case in order to
punish the accused for the prior offense.72 Moreover, as scholars have
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988) (commenting
that propensity evidence may carry risk of unfair prejudice to defendant); Spencer v.
Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 570 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (noting that use of prior
convictions evidence to show action in conformity "needlessly prejudices" accused);
Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892) (discussing prejudice accruing to
defendant when court admits propensity evidence); United States v. Hines, 955 F.2d
1449, 1454 (11th Cir. 1992) (commenting that character evidence has strong potential
for unfair prejudice); United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1992)
(asserting that propensity evidence is likely to prejudice jury and blind it to real issue of
whether accused is guilty of crime charged); People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 467
(N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.) (noting that propensity evidence carries appeal to prejudice
and passion); Rex v. Smith, 11 Crim. App. 229, 237 (Crim. App. 1915) (explaining
why propensity evidence is inadmissible); Regina v. Oddy, 169 Eng. Rep. 499, 502 (Cr.
Cas. Res. 1851) (Lord Campbell, C.J.) (rejecting propensity evidence because it
prejudiced accused as "bad man"); Duane, supra note 9, at 107-11 (discussing prejudice to
accused as justification for propensity rule).
70. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948); see also Peden, 961 F.2d
at 520 (noting risk that jury will characterize accused as "evil person"); United States v.
Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("It is fundamental to American
jurisprudence that 'a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is."')
(quoting United States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1974)); David P.
Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 529, 565 (1994) (discussing danger that jury will convict defendant because it
concludes defendant is "bad man"); Liebman, supra note 6, at 754 (same).
71. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing bar
on propensity evidence as concomitant to presumption of innocence); People v.
Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901) (noting interrelationship between
propensity rule and presumption of innocence). See also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554, 575 (1967) (Warren, C.J. dissenting) (commenting that propensity evidence
jeopardizes presumption of innocence); Reuben, supra note 50, at 21 (reporting that
many judges believe proscription against using propensity evidence is part of the
presumption of innocence).
72. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American
Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the
Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 288 (1995) [hereinafter lmwinkelried,
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suggested, jurors may not regret wrongfully convicting the accused if
they believe the accused committed prior offenses.73 Courts have also
barred admission of propensity evidence on grounds that jurors will
credit propensity evidence with more weight than such evidence
deserves.74 Researchers have shown that character traits are not
sufficiently stable temporally to permit reliable inferences that one
acted in conformity with a character trait. 75 Furthermore, courts have
excluded propensity evidence because such evidence blurs the issues
in the case, redirecting the jury's attention away from the determination
of guilt for the crime charged.76
B. Propensity Evidence As a Violation of Due Process
The many justifications against the use of propensity evidence
reflect the common theme in American jurisprudence that the
admission of propensity evidence prevents a fair trial and thus violates
the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.77 In Murray's Lessee v.
Undertaking the Task]; see also Peden, 961 F.2d at 520 (noting that while a jury may
feel unsure about the government's case, a jury will nevertheless convict on the belief
that the accused is evil).
73.

RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE

165 (2d ed. 1982); 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 780
(4th ed. 1992).
74. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476 (explaining that propensity evidence weighs too
much and over-persuades the jury so as to prejudice the accused as one with bad record);
People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.) (noting jury's or
judge's tendency to accord excessive weight to propensity evidence); IA JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983) (discussing
overvaluation of propensity evidence by jury); lmwinkelried, Some Comments, supra
note 28, at 43 (noting that juries tend to overestimate the value of propensity evidence);
Liebman, supra note 6, at 755 (citing cases).
75. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and
Catharsisin the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 25-31 (1987) (concluding that
individual personality traits do not permit reliable inferences of action in conformity
with personality traits); Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character
Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies,
31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1041-60 (1984) (same); but see Susan M. Davies, Evidence of
Characterto Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 518
(1991) (concluding that individual personality traits do permit reliable inferences of
action in conformity with personality traits); Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone:
Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV.
1,32-34, 64-86 (1993) (same).
76. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 467; Liebman, supra note 6, at 755.
77. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. The failure to observe fundamental fairness,
which is essential to the concept of justice, results in a denial of due process. See, e.g.,
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); accord Kealohapauole v. Shimoda,
800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the very integrity of the judicial system depends on a fair trial. See Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 413 (1991) (noting integrity of judicial system depends on convictions or
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Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,78 the United States Supreme
Court advanced a historical test for ascertaining what constitutes due
process.7 9 The Court held that if the process is not in conflict with any
express constitutional provisions, courts must,
look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in
the common and statue [sic] law of England, before the
emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have
been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having
80
been acted on by them after the settlement of this country.

The Supreme Court elaborated on this historical test in Hurtado v.
California.8 In Hurtado, the Court explained that a process, not
otherwise forbidden, "must be taken to be due process of law, if it can
show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country;
.... 982 The Supreme Court recently re-articulated the definition of
due process in Dowling v. United States.83 The Court defined due
process as "those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the
base of our civil and political institutions,' and which define the
community's sense of fair play and decency." 84
Applying the foregoing historical test, it is clear that the exclusion of
propensity evidence at trial constitutes due process. The settled mode
of proceeding in Anglo-American jurisprudence is prohibition of
propensity evidence to prove action in conformity with a particular
character trait. 85 This ban on propensity evidence has been firmly and
acquittals given by persons who are fair). See infra Part IlI.C for a discussion of how
Rules 413-415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prevent a fundamentally fair trial.
78. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
79. Id. at 276-77.
80. Id. at 277.
81. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
82. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
83. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
84. Id. at 353 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
85. In Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remarked:
The rule which thus forbids the introduction of evidence of other offenses
having no reasonable tendency to prove the crime charged, except in so far as
they may establish a criminal tendency on the part of the accused . . . arises
out of the fundamental demandfor justice andfairness which lies at the basis of
our jurisprudence. If such evidence were allowed ... persons accused of crime
would be greatly prejudiced....
Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
The rule against propensity evidence has been firmly established in England. For
example, in Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales, 17 Cox. CR. L. 704 (Cr.
Cas. Res. 1893), Lord Chancellor Herschell stated:
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending
to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those
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historically established since at least the seventeenth century in
England and, as evidenced in case law and state and federal codes of
evidence, has had continuing validity to the present. 6 This centuriesold rule has therefore become firmly embedded in the principles
underlying the Due Process Clauses.87 It is a fundamental conception
of how defendants should be tried in American courtrooms.
Courts' rejection of propensity evidence proffered to prove action in
conformity with a particular character trait can be traced to at least
1684, in Hampden's Trial.88 In that case, Justice Withins, of the
King's Bench, noted that in a prior case the King's Bench had
excluded evidence of prior forgeries committed by the accused who
was on trial for forgery.89 Justice Withins explained that the court had
excluded the evidence because the evidence would "rak[e] into men's
course of life, to pick up evidence that they cannot be prepared to
answer to." 90 Similarly, in 1692, the Lord Chief Justice Holt at Old
Bailey excluded propensity evidence in a murder prosecution in
covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that
the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have
committed the offence for which he is being tried.
Id. at 708; accord Rex v. Smith, 11 Crim. App. 229, 237 (Crim. App. 1915) (noting
propensity rule); Regina v. Oddy, 169 Eng. Rep. 499, 502 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1851) (Lord
Campbell, C.J.) (rejecting propensity evidence because it prejudiced accused as "bad
man").
86. See WIGMORE, supra note 74, § 58.2, at 1213 (noting ban on propensity had
received judicial sanction for three centuries); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 1 404[08], at 404-44 (Joseph M. McLaughlin 1996) ("Although all American
jurisdictions agree that no evidence may be introduced which seeks solely to prove that
the accused has a criminal disposition ..
");Leonard, supra note 6, at 305
(commenting that proscription against using propensity evidence has historically been
important tenet of American evidence law).
87. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-19 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
(defining jurisdictional "presence" as procedural due process by relying on historical,
continuing traditions in Anglo-American jurisprudence). See also infra note 121 (for
detailed explanation of Burnham definiton of jurisdictional presence).
In People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901), the New York Court of
Appeals noted that:
[S]o universally recognized and so firmly established in all Englishspeaking lands, [the propensity rule] is rooted in that jealous regard for the
liberty of the individual which has distinguished our jurisprudence from all
others, at least from the birth of the Magna Charta. It is the product of that
same humane and enlightened public spirit which . . . has decreed that every
person charged with the commission of a crime shall be protected by the
presumption of innocence until he has been proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id.
88. 9 Cob. St. Tr. 1053 (K.B. 1684).
89. Id. at 1103.
90. Id.
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Harrison's Trial.9 Upon the evidence's proffer, Justice Holt
remarked: "Hold, what are you doing now? Are you going to arraign
his whole92 life? Away, away, that ought not to be; that is nothing to the
matter.
Pre-Revolutionary war colonial courts adopted the proscription
against using propensity evidence as well. In Rex v. Doaks, the
accused had been indicted for keeping a bawdy house.9 4 The
prosecution sought to introduce the accused's prior acts of
lasciviousness. 95 The highest court in Massachusetts, the Superior
Court of Judicature, held that the propensity evidence was
inadmissible. 96
In addition to the seventeenth and eighteenth century cases, the
United States Supreme Court has continuously ruled against the use of
propensity evidence. One of the earliest Supreme Court decisions
addressing the ban on prior crimes evidence was Boyd v. United
States.97 In Boyd, the prosecution charged the defendants with
murder following a robbery attempt. 98 The trial court permitted the
prosecution to introduce evidence of prior robberies committed by the
defendants. 99 The Court held that the prior crimes evidence was
inadmissible.'O° The Court reasoned that the prior crimes evidence
unduly prejudiced the defendants by impressing upon the jurors the
notion that the defendants were "wretches" who were undeserving of
certain prescribed trial protections."'
In Brinegarv. United States, 0 2 the Supreme Court implied that the
prohibition of admitting propensity evidence was embedded in the
concept of due process.'0 3 In that case, the Court concluded that in a
91. 12 How. St. Tr. 834, 864 (Old Bailey 1692).
92. Id.
93. Quincy's Mass. Repts 90 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1763).
94. Id. at 90.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 90-91.
97. 142 U.S. 450 (1892).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 454.
100. Id. at 458.
101. Id.
102. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
103. Notwithstanding the persuasive authority against the use of propensity
evidence, the United States Supreme Court has never expressly held that admission of
propensity evidence to show action in conformity with a particular character trait
violates the Due Process Clauses. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991)
(declining to reach issue of whether admitting propensity evidence violates due
process); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572-74 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
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prosecution for illegal importation of liquor, testimony of a
government agent that he had arrested the defendant several months
earlier for illegal transportation of liquor was inadmissible.'0 4 The
Court stated:
Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience
in the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the
Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent
with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights
of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and
unjust convictions,
with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty, and
10 5
property.
In Michelson v. United States,10 6 the Court expressly placed its
imprimatur on the common law rule barring propensity evidence.0 7 In
the compelling language of Justice Jackson, the Court reasoned:
Courts that follow the common law tradition almost
unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to
any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish
the probability of his guilt . . . . The state may not show
defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or
ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might
logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because
character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge
one with a bad general record and deny
him a fair opportunity
08
to defend against a particular charge.1
The Court recently reaffirmed the ban on propensity evidence in

Huddleston v. United States.10 9
(commenting that the Court has never held that use of prior convictions to show
propensity violates due process, but probably would do so).
Paul F. Rothstein, Georgetown University Law Center Professor and consultant to the
House and Senate on evidence rules, has noted that the Supreme Court has consistently
shied away from determining that use of earlier wrongdoing as evidence presents
constitutional problems. Harvey Berkman, Crime Bill Sex Rule Stirs Evidence Debate,
NAT'LL.J., Sept. 5, 1994, at A16.
104. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 173.
105. Id. at 174.
106. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
107. Id. at 475-76.
108. Id.
109. 485 U.S. 681, 685-87 (1988) (discussing how Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
prohibits the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on
the defendant's character, unless the evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case,
such as the defendant's motive or opportunity).
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Moreover, Chief Justice Warren in Spencer v. Texas' commented
that the use of prior convictions to show propensity is fundamentally at
odds with the policies underlying due process."' He reasoned that the
' 12
use of prior convictions "needlessly prejudices the accused."
Justice Warren also explained that evidence of prior crimes to show
action in conformity with a particular character trait jeopardizes the
constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence. 1 3 In addition,
14
Justice Warren noted that the ban on propensity is well established.
He stated that previous decisions by the Supreme Court, federal courts
of appeals, and state courts suggested that evidence of prior crimes in
order to show criminal disposition would violate the Due Process
Clause.'' 5 No other justice disagreed with Justice Warren's
propositions.
More recently, in Estelle v. McGuire, 1 6 Justice O'Connor
suggested that in certain circumstances admitting evidence of prior
crimes in order to show disposition to commit the crime charged may
violate the Due Process Clause. Justice O'Connor commented that the
fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause mandates
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 17 She asserted that the
principles underlying the Due Process Clause prohibit presumptions
that have the effect of relieving the prosecution of its burden of
persuasion of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every
element of a crime." 8 Justice O'Connor's analysis suggests that
110. 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
111. Id. at 573-74 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 570 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 575 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286,
293-94 (N.Y. 1901) (asserting that propensity rule developed from constitutional
mandate of presumption of innocence).
114. 385 U.S. at 572 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 573-74 & nn.4-6 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (citing Marshall v. United
States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13 (1959); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 47576 (1948); Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892); United States v.
Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574, 576-77 (3d Cir. 1960); Swann v. United States, 195 F.2d 689,
690-91 (4th Cir. 1952); Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1948);
Railton v. United States, 127 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1942); Tedesco v. United States,
118 F.2d 737, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1941); State v. Myrick, 317 P.2d 485, 487 (Kan. 1957);
Scarbrough v. State, 37 So.2d 748, 750 (Miss. 1948); People v. Molineaux, 61 N.E.
286, 293-94 (N.Y. 1901); Seay v. State, 395 S.W.2d 40, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965);
State v. Scott, 175 P.2d 1016, 1022-23 (Utah 1947)).
116. 502 U.S. 62 (1991).
117. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79, 85 (1986); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
118. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307,
313 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1979); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)).
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propensity evidence creates a mandatory presumption that the accused
committed the crime charged because he was involved in prior similar
offenses. Parsed in this fashion, she implies that use of prior offenses
violates due process." 9
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that
propensity evidence violates due process, its decision in Burnham v.
Superior Court of California12 suggests that the current Justices may
agree that admission of such evidence to prove action in conformity
with a specific character trait would violate due process.' 2' It remains
to be seen, however, whether the Supreme Court will explicitly hold
that Rules 413-415 violate the Due Process Clause.
In addition to the Supreme Court's statements, courts of appeals
routinely acknowledge the validity of the prohibition of propensity
evidence, 22 and some courts of appeals have expressly determined
119. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
12 1. In Burnham, the Court held that jurisdictional "presence" satisfied the notions
of procedural due process. Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring), 628-29 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Jurisdictional presence means presence within a jurisdiction such that
courts of that jurisdiction can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the
person present in that jurisdiction. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Kennedy and, in part, Justice White, concluded that "jurisdiction based on
physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard.
... Id. at 619.
Tracing century-old cases, Justice Scalia determined that one of the most firmly
established principles in American jurisprudence is that presence within a forum confers
jurisdiction over the person. Id. at 610-19 (citing, inter alia, Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63,
67 (Conn. 1793)).
Thus, members of the Court defined what constituted procedural due process as what had
developed over several centuries in Anglo-American jurisprudence. To the Justices, such
an historical basis signifies a rule's acceptance as fundamental and well established.
Similarly, the members of the Court likely will acknowledge that the ban on propensity
evidence has become a fundamental conception of justice underlying our civil and
political institutions, defining the community's sense of fair play and decency. See
supra notes 77-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposition that the
propensity rule has become embedded in the notions of due process by virtue of its
historical but continuing validity.
122. See generally United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1995);
Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Duncan v. Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995); Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Has No Horse, 11 F.3d
104, 106 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1992);
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1307 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Concepcion,
983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992); Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir.
1991); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401, 419, 420 (3d Cir.
1991); United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 151-52 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d
581, 589 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir.
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that the prohibition is embedded in the Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution.' 23 These courts reason that if the jury can draw no
permissible inferences from the propensity evidence, the evidence
fundamentally prevents a fair trial.'24 For example, in United States v.
Young, 25 the government prosecuted the defendants for a marijuana
production and distribution business. 26 The district court permitted
the government to offer evidence that the defendants also illegally
produced alcohol. 27 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court improperly admitted the
evidence regarding illegal alcohol production. 28 The court reasoned
that the only inference the jury could draw from this evidence was that
the defendants were more likely to have illegally produced marijuana
because they had the disposition to do so as evidenced by their acts of
illegally producing alcohol.1 29 The court rejected the government's
argument that the evidence was relevant to the issue of the defendants'
intent, noting
the dissimilarity between producing marijuana and
130
alcohol.

Also illustrative is the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in McKinney v. Rees.13 ' The McKinney
court expressly held that the use of evidence to show propensity
1985); United States v. Harris, 733 F.2d 994, 1006 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Wagoner, 713 F.2d 1371, 1374-76 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Boykin, 679 F.2d
1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608
F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 910 (5th Cir.
1978) (en bane); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972); Lovely
v. United States, 169 F.2d 386, 388-89 (4th Cir. 1948); United States v. Dia, 826 F.
Supp. 1237, 1240-42 (D. Ariz. 1993), affd in part, vacated in part, 39 F.3d 1189 (9th
Cir. 1994).
123. See, e.g., Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989)
(acknowledging that admission of other crimes evidence in criminal prosecution raises
due process issue).
124. See, e.g., Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991)
(asserting that propensity evidence for which there are no permissible inferences
violates due process).
125. 39 F.3d 1561 (11th Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 1564.
127. Id. at 1572-73.
128. Id. at 1573.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037 (9th
Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Duncan v. Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995)
(Ninth Circuit case holding that admitting evidence of prior acts of child molestation
violates the Due Process clause); see also infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text
(discussing Henry).
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violates the Due Process Clause. 3 2 In McKinney, the victim, the
defendant's mother, died after her assailant slit her throat., 33 The
police failed to identify a murder weapon. 134 However, the police
found the defendant at the scene of the crime wearing a Buck knife on
his belt. 35 At trial, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce
evidence that one year earlier the police had confiscated a knife owned
by the defendant.136 The court also admitted evidence that the
defendant at times in the past had worn a knife while wearing
camouflage and had scratched the words "Death is His" on the door to
137
his dormitory room closet.
The jury convicted the defendant of
138
mother.
his
murdering
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the
defendant's federal habeas corpus petition.'3 The court held that
admission of the "other acts" evidence deprived the defendant of a fair
trial in violation of the Due Process Clause. 140 The court explained
that the evidence regarding the knife the police had confiscated one
year earlier was not relevant.' 4 ' The court remarked that the only
inference the jury could have drawn from such evidence was
improper. 4 2 Similarly, the court reasoned that the evidence of the
accused's wearing camouflage and scratching "Death is His" on his
dormitory closet door created an impermissible
inference that the
43
accused had a propensity to murder his mother.
Other authority, namely state case law and various codes of
evidence, suggest that the rule against using propensity evidence to
show action in conformity with a particular character trait is a concept
132. McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1385-86.
133. Id. at 1381.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1382.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1379.
139. Id. at 1386.
140. Id. The court also noted that use of propensity evidence is impermissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence and California Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1380 (citing FED.
R. EvID. 404(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West Supp. 1993)); but see CAL. EVID. CODE §
1108 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for the admission of evidence of prior sexual
offenses committed by a defendant accused of a sexual offense, unless the evidence is
inadmissible because of the risk of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading
the jury).
141. McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1382.
142. Id. Specifically, the court refused to permit the jury to draw the inference that,
because the accused owned a knife which the police confiscated one year earlier, the
accused was the type of person who owned the knife used to murder his mother. Id.
143. Id. at 1383.
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embedded in the Due Process Clause. For example, the Federal Rules
of Evidence'" and the evidence rules of thirty-four states illustrate the5
4
fundamental proscription against using propensity evidence as well.
Many states have transported Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of
146
Evidence into their own codes of evidence.
Moreover, the common law precedents in other states and the
District of Columbia demonstrate steadfast adherence to the propensity
rule. 147 For example, in People v. Zackowitz, 48 Chief Justice
144. See FED. R. EvID. 404 (proscribing use of propensity evidence to show action in
conformity with character trait); see also supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the codification of the common law rule barring use of propensity evidence
in the Federal Rules of Evidence).
145. See generally ALASKA R. EVID. 404 (West 1994), COLO. R. EvID. 404 (West
1989); DEL. R. EvID. 404 (Michie 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 90.404 (West Supp.
1996); HAW. R. EVID. 404 (Michie 1995); IDAHO R. EvID. 404 (Michie 1994); IOWA R.
EVID. 404 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-447 (1994); KY. R. EVID. 404 (Michie
1994); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404 (West 1995); ME. R. EvID. 404 (West 1996); MICH.
R. EvID. 404 (West 1996); MINN. R. EVID. 404 (West 1980); Miss. R. EVID. 404 (1994);
MONT. R. EVID. 404 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §
48.045 (Michie 1996); N.H. R. EvlD. 404 (Michie 1996); N.J. R. EVID. 404 (West
1993); N.M. R. EvID. 404 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8c-1, R. 404 (Michie 1988
& Cumm. Supp. 1995); N.D. R. EVID. 404 (Michie 1996); OHIO R. EvID. 404 (Baldwin
1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2404 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.170 (1988);
R.I. R. EVID. 404 (Michie 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-12-4 and § 19-12-5n
(Michie 1995); TENN. R. EvID. 404 (Michie 1996); UTAH R. EvID. 404 (Michie 1996);
VT. R. EVID. 404 (1995); WASH. R. EVID. 404 (West 1995); W. VA. R. EVID. 404 (Michie
1996); Wyo. R. EvID. 404 (Michie 1996). But see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1420
(West Supp. 1996) (providing that for defendants charged with sexual offenses "the court
may admit evidence that the defendant committed past acts which would constitute a
sexual offense and may consider the bearing this evidence has on any matter to which it
is relevant"); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for the admission
of evidence of prior sexual offenses committed by defendant accused of a sexual offense,
unless the evidence is inadmissible because of the risk of undue prejudice, confusing the
issues, or misleading the jury); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.37 (West Supp.
1996) (providing that, notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, TEXAS RULES OF CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant against
a child who is the victim of the alleged offense shall be admitted for its bearing on
relevant matters).
146. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rule 404 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See supra note 145 for a list of states that have incorporated Rule 404 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence into their evidence codes.
147. See generally Anonymous v. State, 507 So. 2d 972, 973-74 (Ala. 1987); State
v. Holliday, 268 A.2d 368, 369 (Conn. 1970); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 56
(App. D.C. 1986); Brown v. State, 398 S.E.2d 34, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); People v.
Kannapes, 567 N.E.2d 377, 379-80 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Penley v. State, 506 N.E.2d
806, 808 (Ind. 1987); Ross v. State, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (Md. 1976); Commonwealth v.
Chalifoux, 291 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Mass. 1973); State v. Clark, 801 S.W.2d 701, 703
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990), People v. Powell, 543 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 497 (Pa. 1988); State v. Griffin, 285 S.E.2d
631, 633-34 (S.C. 1981); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (Va. 1979).
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Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals, reversed a
murder conviction because the trial court had permitted certain
propensity evidence. 149 In Zackowitz, the accused had been charged
with shooting a heckler on the street who had propositioned the
accused's wife. 150 The trial court permitted the prosecution to admit
evidence that the accused, at the time of the murder, kept various
firearms in his apartment.'15 Justice Cardozo held that the trial court
should have excluded the weapons evidence, as it manifestly infected
the fairness of the trial. 52 He reasoned that the only purpose of the
evidence was to show that the accused "was a man of vicious and
dangerous propensities, who because of those propensities was more
likely to kill with deliberate and premeditated design than a man of
irreproachable life and amiable manners."'' 5 3 Justice Cardozo
explained in a memorable and oft-quoted passage that the rule against
using propensity evidence was historically of fundamental importance
in criminal prosecutions:
If a murderous propensity may be proved against a defendant as
one of the tokens of his guilt, a rule of criminal evidence, long
believed to be of fundamental importance for the protection of
the innocent, must be first declared away. Fundamental hitherto
has been the rule that character is never an issue in a criminal
54
prosecution unless the defendant chooses to make it one.'
Besides the case law and codes of evidence, various commentators
have suggested that admission of propensity evidence violates the Due
Process Clauses. 5 5 For example, Wigmore, in discussing the
inadmissibility of bad acts to show the character of the accused,
enumerated the policies typically associated with the Due Process
56
Clause as reasons justifying the ban on propensity evidence.1
Similarly, a district court judge asserted that the ban on propensity

See infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of state cases where
courts have excluded propensity evidence in cases of sexual abuse and child molestation.
148. 172 N.E. 466 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.).
149. Id. at 469.
150. Id. at 467.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 469.
153. Id. at 467.
154. Id. at 468.
155. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 86, 1 404[01], at 404-18 (noting that ban on
propensity evidence was "molded by underlying constitutional pressures"); Duane, supra
note 9, at 108 ("[The] use of character evidence ...would violate the Constitutional
guarantees of Due Process and the presumption of innocence.").
156. See WIGMORE, supra note 74, § 58.2, at 1213-15.
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evidence is central to the criminal law concept that the law protects the
accused from forced inculpation by proof of past misconduct. 7
IV. RULES 413-415 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

A. The Rules Contravene the ProhibitionAgainst Propensity
Evidence, Firmly Embedded in the Constitution
As demonstrated above, state and federal case law and various
codes of evidence indicate that the proscription against admitting
propensity evidence as substantive evidence is embedded in the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution. The propensity rule, which is one
of the most fundamental conceptions of justice, was developed over
several centuries, and defines the community's sense of fairness.'58
This is evidenced by the settled usage and mode of proceeding that
existed in English common and statutory law.159 Hence, admission of
propensity evidence in a sexual assault or child molestation trial
violates due process. 6 °
Rules 413-415 each state in mandatory language that evidence of
other offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible.
Thus, the new rules require, in criminal and civil cases involving
sexual assault and child molestation, admission of proffered evidence
of the accused's or civil defendant's commission of other offenses of
sexual assault or child molestation.' 6' Because of the mandatory
nature of the rules, in sexual assault and child molestation cases, the
157. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 86, 404[04], at 404-26.
158. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990) (discussing
parameters for determining what constitutes "due process").
159. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (defining what
constitutes due process by referring to historical and continuing legal traditions);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) (same); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-77 (1855) (same).
160. Cf. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 78 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that admitting evidence of prior crimes to show disposition to commit
crime charged may violate due process); Spencer v. Texas 385 U.S. 554, 570, 573-74
(1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that use of prior convictions to show
propensity is fundamentally at odds with policies underlying due process); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (implying prohibition of admitting propensity
evidence is embedded in Due Process Clause); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 138586 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that use of evidence to show propensity violates Due
Process Clause); Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989)
(acknowledging that admission of other crimes evidence in criminal prosecution raises
due process issues).
161. See supra notes 1-3 for relevant text of Rules 413-415.
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Federal Rules' general prohibition on the admission of character
62
evidence to show disposition to commit offenses does not apply.
Since the rules provide that propensity evidence may be considered
for any matter to which it is relevant, it is clear that Rules 413-415
automatically invite introduction of prior offenses of sexual assault or
child molestation. The federal prosecutor will proffer such evidence
solely for the purpose of showing that, because the accused previously
committed acts of sexual assault or child molestation, the accused is a
person of dangerous and criminal character, a person likely to have
sexually assaulted the victim or molested a child.163 Although
character is relevant,' 64 as Justices Jackson and Cardozo noted, it has
traditionally been excluded on policy
grounds embedded in the
165
fundamental notions of due process.
B. The Rules UnconstitutionallyRequire Irrational
and ArbitraryInferences
There are several basic points that we may make about the Due
Process Clause and its effect on trial procedures. The Framers meant
the clause to be flexible and did not seek to prescribe a specific set of
rules.166 The purpose of a constitution is to provide only the basic
167
outline and to allow courts and legislatures to work out the details.
The Due Process Clause works as a bar to certain police practices,
statutory presumptions, evidentiary rulings, instructions, and
comments of prosecutors. Thus, it works in the negative and, as
applied by courts, results in a series of prohibitions or "shall nots. ' ' 68
162. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (prohibiting admission of evidence of person's
character trait to prove action in conformity therewith); FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (barring
admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove character of person in order to show
action in conformity therewith). See also supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for
relevant text and discussion of Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
163. See, e.g., People v,Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 467-68 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo,
C.J.) (explaining propensity evidence).
164. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
165. See id. at 475-76 (commenting that prosecution may not proffer evidence of
prior offenses even though it may be logically persuasive that accused is, by
propensity, a probable perpetrator of crime); See also Zackowitz, 172 N.E. at 467-68
(acknowledging relevance of character but concluding that character can never be an
issue in criminal prosecution because of fundamental ban on propensity evidence).
166. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50, 156-58 (1968) (extending
right to jury trial in criminal prosecutions to state defendants); Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 66-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing flexibility of
Fourteenth Amendment); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (commenting
on absorption of first eight amendments to Constitution in Fourteenth Amendment).
167. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 932 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
168. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-303 (1973) (exclusion of
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For instance, police shall not strike a suspect during interrogation 169 or
initiate the idea of committing a crime. 70 The Clause, as applied to
police practices, has its own long history, but it is only of indirect use
in determining whether a rule of evidence breaches the Fifth or
17
Fourteenth Amendments.
' The core right is, after all, nothing more
7
or less than a fair trial.

1

In the context of a fair trial, a substantial body of case law holds that
"rationality" is essential to permit inferences based on evidence. The
rule that presumptions and inferences be rationally grounded and pass
the "more likely than not test" is one important facet of the body of
173
decisional law. Specifically, the holdings in Leary v. United States
and various other cases clearly establish that an inference is
"'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at
least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more
likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
174
depend."'

In Leary, the Supreme Court held that possession of marijuana
would not support an inference that the defendant knew that the
substance had been imported. 75 The Court noted that marijuana is
grown both domestically and abroad. 76 The Court therefore reasoned
that the inference was irrational and arbitrary because the available data
did not substantially assure that the majority of marijuana users knew
declarations against penal interest and limitations on the right to cross-examine a
critical witness "denied [defendant] a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental
standards of due process").
169. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936).
170. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973).
171. See, e.g., Palko, 302 U.S. 319 at 323.
172. See, e.g., Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294-303 (evidentiary rulings by trial court
deprived defendant of fair trial).
173. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
174. Id. at 36 (citing and discussing Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
Compare United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), with United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136 (1965)). In United States v. Gainey, the Court upheld an instruction that
"unexplained presence at a still" permitted an inference that a person was "carrying" on
the business of a distiller. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 67-68. The Court concluded that the
"carrying on offense" was comprehensive, and common knowledge of the character of a
still was permissible. Id. at n.6. However, in United States v. Romano, the Court made
the important distinction that "presence" at a still would not support an inference of
"possession, custody, or control." Romano, 382 U.S. at 141. The Court concluded that
possession was a narrower offense and presence was "too tenuous to permit a reasonable
inference of guilt" for that offense. Id. "[T]he inference of the one fact [possession]
from proof of the other [presence] is arbitrary." Id. (citing Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463, 467 (1943)).
175. Leary, 395 U.S. at 52-53.
176. Id.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

of their marijuana's origin.'
Thus, the Court concluded that the
presumption denied the defendant due process of law because the
presumed fact did not more likely 78
than not "flow from the proved fact
on which it was made to depend."'
However, in Turner v. United States, 179 decided one year after
Leary, the Court allowed an inference of knowledge of importation to
flow from the possession of heroin. 80 The Court noted that little, if
any, heroin is domestically manufactured. 8 ' The Court therefore
reasoned that it was permissible for the jury8 to infer that heroin users
knew that the substance had been imported. 1
In Barnes v. United States, 83 the Court upheld another inference.
In Barnes, the Court held that the jury could permissibly find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused, in possession of recently stolen
Treasury checks payable to persons he did not know, knew the checks
were stolen.'84 The Court reasoned that the "traditional common law
inference deeply rooted in our law" for unexplained possession of
recently stolen property would permit a jury to infer that the accused
knew the property was stolen.' The Court therefore concluded that
the permissive inference satisfied the requirements of due process.'86
More recently, the Court held that state rules that excluded classes of
evidence without an analysis of reliability violated due process. In
Chambers v. Mississippi, 87 the Court concluded that a state rule
excluding all declarations against penal interest without reference to the
reliability of the declarations denied due process. 88 In Rock v.
Arkansas,8 9 the Court, following its holding in Chambers, held that a
per se exclusion of a defendant's post-hypnotic statements violated due
process because it excluded reliable and unreliable evidence without
examining corroborative details.' 9°
177. Id. at 52.

178. Id. at 36; see also id. at 52-53 (noting that to presume that the majority of
marijuana users knew the origin of their marijuana would result in "serious incursions
into the teachings of Tot, Gainey, and Romano").

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

396 U.S. 398 (1970).
Id. at 415-16.
Id. at416.
Id.
412 U.S. 837 (1973).
Id. at 845.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 846.
410 U.S. 284 (1973).
Id. at 294-303.
483 U.S. 44 (1987).
Id. at 56-61.
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These teachings of the Court may create some disagreement in
application, but the constitutional test is clear: an inference must be
rational.' 9' Let us apply this constitutional test to Rule 413. If a
defendant were convicted of the crime of rape in 1990, is it more likely
than not that he committed the crime of rape for which he is on trial in
1996? Or, on the other hand, is it "irrational and arbitrary" to use the
proved fact, a 1990 rape conviction, to establish the presumed fact in
issue, the 1996 rape? Is there a "substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend"' 92
There is simply no assurance, substantial or insubstantial, to
support such a nexus. Any discussion of the facts beyond the skeleton
provided demonstrates the redundancy of the new rules and the genius
of Rule 404. Once we begin to ask any qualifying questions about the
facts, seeking to know whether the crimes involved similar victims, or
were limited to a specific time, place, or modus operandi, we run
squarely into well developed exceptions to the general prohibition in
Rule 404(a) against propensity evidence.193 Propensity evidence does
not pass the more likely than not test. So we see that what the new
rules do is eliminate the need to ask for a justification for admission as
required by Rule 404(b) and rely on propensity evidence without being
honest or principled about doing SO. 19 4 The new rules sweep all past
offenses and all past offenders into a single category. The only
foundation for admissibility is the mere fact of past involvement or a
past accusation, for even prior acquittal would not bar admissibility
since the rules expressly state that evidence of mere commission of
another offense is admissible. Thus, the new rules operate in an all or
nothing manner and violate Chambers and Rock, as well as the
holdings set forth in Leary and its progeny.' 95
The new rules appear to be a crude effort by the legislature to
expand the notion that sexual offenders have higher rates of recidivism
than other types of offenders, such as burglars, drug offenders, and
violent robbers. However, as noted here and elsewhere, there is no
scientific or statistical support for this legislative theory. A recent
191. See supra text accompanying notes 173-78 (discussing the requirement of
"rationality" for inferences).
192. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing the "more likely
than not" test).
193. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b). See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text
(discussing Rule 404).
194. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 404(b)).
195. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing Chambers and
Rock).
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Justice Department study of same-offense recidivism of approximately
100,000 prisoners reports a 7.7% recidivism rate for rapists,
compared to 31.9% for burglars,
24.8% for drug offenders, and
96
19.6% for violent robbers.

Moreover, the new rules paint too broadly and sweep all sexual
assaults and all child molestation into the same category. There is no
attempt to set out standards that might rationally connect sex offenders
by category (e.g., rapists, sodomites, fondlers, peeping toms,
fetishists, and others). Even the term "child molestation" is too broad
because the victims range from toddlers to pre-teens. Without some
distinction based on preferences that would rationally categorize sex
offenders, there is no "assurance" that the crime in issue has been
more likely than not committed by the person on trial who has at some
point sexually assaulted or molested an unknown victim in an
unknown manner. Indeed, the circumstances of these prior offenses
are not relevant as far as these rules state.
Finally, the language of the new rules is circular. For instance,
Rule 413 states that another sexual assault is admissible and may be
considered for "its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant." This
adds nothing to the general definition of relevance set forth in Rule
401 197 or to the list of specific exceptions to the ban on propensity
under Rule 404(b). Theoretically, it threatens confusion by creating
another relevance barrier for the prosecutor to leap after clearing the
Rule 401 and Rule 404(b) barriers. The absence of a time frame in the
new rules lends additional force to the irrationality and arbitrariness
arguments. Signature crimes gain their power to persuade by virtue of
the proximity in time, place, and method. As time passes, someone
may commit a similar crime.198 That is why the common law rules
require strong evidence of similarity as a foundation of admissibility.
As time passes, the inference-that the presumed fact is more likely
than not to flow from the proved fact-loses substance.

196. See ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY,
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 6 (1989).

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF

197. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in full: "Relevant evidence
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.

198. See United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
similar crimes will be committed by other people, given enough time, hence, "the value
of the other acts as an earmark is diminished").
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C. The Rules Prevent a FundamentallyFairTrial

In addition to the rules failing the Supreme Court's "historical test"
of what constitutes due process and unconstitutionally requiring
irrational and arbitrary inferences,' 99 the new rules violate the basic
notion of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause.
Fundamental fairness is essential to the concept of justice; the very
integrity of the judicial system depends on convictions or acquittals
given by persons who are fair. 200 By requiring admission of
propensity evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases, the
rules violate due process because they prevent a fundamentally fair
trial.2° '
By requiring the admission of propensity evidence, the rules prevent
a fundamentally fair trial, and thus violate due process, for several
reasons. As the drafters of Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognized, the basic nature of propensity evidence prevents a
constitutionally fair trial.20 2 If the federal prosecutor proffers evidence
showing that the accused is by propensity more likely to have
committed the sexual assault or act of child molestation in the case,
jurors will likely credit the evidence with more weight than it
deserves.20 3 Such evidence so over-persuades jurors that they will
lose their impartiality and pre-judge the accused as one with a bad
general character. Therefore, jurors exposed to propensity evidence
more readily convict the accused.20 4 This denies the accused a "fair

199. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (discussing how the rules fail
the Supreme Court's "historic test" for determining what constitutes due process); see
also supra notes 166-98 and accompanying text (discussing the rules' unconstitutional
requirement of irrational and arbitrary inferences).
200. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991).
201. Cf. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 469 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.)
(concluding that propensity evidence manifestly defeats fairness of trial).
202. Although prior crimes evidence is highly probative, it is constitutionally
impermissible for the jury to infer from this evidence that the accused committed the
charged act of sexual assault or child molestation. Cf.Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926
F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (asserting that propensity evidence for which there are no
permissible inferences violates due process). See also supra note 77 and accompanying
text (discussing fundamental fairness as essential to the concept of justice).
203. See supra note 74 (discussing tendency of jury to overvalue propensity
evidence). Jurors will credit propensity evidence with more weight than it deserves even
though recent research has indicated that character traits are not sufficiently stable
enough over time to permit reliable inferences that one acted in conformity with a
character trait. See Leonard, supra note 75, at 25-31; Mendez, supra note 75, at 104160.
204. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
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opportunity to defend against a particular charge. 2 °5 Moreover, "[i]t
is fundamental to American jurisprudence that 'a defendant must be
tried for what he did, not for who he is.,,,2o6

The new rules also impair a fair trial because they overly burden the
accused. The prosecutor, armed with the new rules as ammunition,
will introduce evidence of prior offenses, thus forcing the accused to
continuously mount defenses against such evidence. It should be
remembered that the rules permit any type of evidence regarding sexual
assault or child molestation. 20 7 The propensity evidence does not have
to be a prior conviction. Moreover, the rules do not restrict the
evidence to a certain time frame. Thus, the rules permit a prosecutor to
proffer testimony that the defendant sexually assaulted or molested
another person more than ten years in the past. The accused must
counter the prosecutor's damning evidence seriatim, preventing him
from mounting an adequate defense to the sexual assault or child
molestation charge that is the subject of the trial. 208 Further, not only
is admission of propensity evidence overly burdensome, it also blurs
the issues in the case. Rather than focusing on the sexual assault or
child molestation at issue in the trial, the propensity evidence will
redirect the jury's attention from the determination of the actual issue in
the case.20 9
In addition, the new rules prevent a fair trial by vitiating a district
court's discretion to admit evidence regarding the commission of other
offenses of sexual assault or child molestation.210 By mandating that
prior acts evidence is admissible,the rules prohibit a district court from
balancing the probativeness and prejudice of such evidence as
permitted in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 1' Thus, the
205. Id.
206. United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Meyers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977)).
207. See supra notes 1-3 for relevant text of Rules 413-415.
208. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 362 (1990) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (asserting that introduction of prior crimes evidence requires defendant to
mount second defense to offense for which defendant has already been punished or
acquitted).
209. Liebman, supra note 6, at 755; cf. People v. Zackowitz, 172 N.E. 466, 468
(N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.) (asserting that admission of propensity evidence
predisposes the jury to view the defendant as guilty).
210. But see Anne Elsberry Kyl, Note, The Propriety of Propensity: The Effects and
Operation of New Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 659, 669-73
(1995) (arguing that Rules 413 and 414 merely create discretionary exceptions to ban
propensity evidence).
211. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in full:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
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accused in cases involving sexual assault and child molestation does
not receive potential fairness protections, because the rules are not
subject to the district court's discretion to balance the potential
prejudice and probativeness of the propensity evidence.
Regardless of whether the rules are subject to Rule 403 balancing,
they needlessly and unduly prejudice the person accused in sexual
assault and child molestation cases, in absolute contravention of Rule
404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 1 2 Such evidence impresses
upon the jurors the notion that the accused is a "wretch., 213 Thus,
there is a great risk that jurors will incorrectly decide a case because the
jury will find the accused's prior acts repugnant.21 4 Propensity
evidence tends to poison the jurors' minds, preventing them from
being impartial triers of fact by generating hostility against the
accused.21 5 This is especially true in sexual assault and child
molestation cases.2 16 The Chicago Jury Project provided empirical
confirmation of this observation. 1 7 In that study, researchers
discovered that jurors classified sex offenses as reprehensible,2 8
especially if the victim was a young child.21 9 Subsequent research has
confirmed the Chicago Jury Project findings.22°
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
212. See supra note 69 (outlining courts' and commentators' numerous justifications
for the propensity rule, and general conclusion that propensity evidence is highly
prejudicial).
213. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892); see also Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 570 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (same).
214. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task, supra note 72, at 296; William
Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A DiagrammaticApproach, 9
PEPP. L. REV. 297, 300 n.9 (1982).
215. See HARRY C. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 182, at 326 (4th ed. 1935);
WEINSTEIN, supra note 86,
404[18], at 404-116.1; lmwinkelried, Undertaking the Task,
supra note 72, at 296.
216. See, e.g., Scott v. Lawrence, 36 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1994) (commenting
that rape and sexual assault convictions are among most prejudicial types of information
presented to jury); United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting
that the implications of prior acts of child molestation and abuse of women are highly
inflammatory and prejudicial), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 513 (1995); United States v.
Buhl, 712 F. Supp. 53, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (recognizing that juror hostility heightened
in sexual assault cases), aff'd without op., 899 F.2d 1219 (3d Cir. 1990).
217. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
2 18. Id. at 397.
219. Id. at 396-97.
220. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:
THE SEVERITY OF CRIME (Jan. 1984) (reporting that survey of 60,000 adults revealed
offenses of rape and child molestation were seen as the most heinous crimes after
homicide).
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The new rules also prevent a fundamentally fair trial because they
jeopardize the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence
until proven guilty. 22' As the Supreme Court commented in Taylor v.
Kentucky, 222 the presumption of innocence, though not part of the text
of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, is a part of the basic historical
fabric, and must therefore be included in criminal jury instructions.223
Several judges opposed the new rules on grounds that the proscription
against using propensity evidence is part of the presumption of
innocence.224 The rules, by admitting propensity evidence in sexual
assault and child molestation cases, eviscerate the presumption of
innocence because jurors no longer will presume the accused innocent.
Rather, on hearing evidence that the accused committed prior acts of
sexual assault and child molestation, jurors will deem the accused
reprehensible and a "bad person. 225 What is even more abhorrent is
that none of the new rules require that the propensity evidence be a
prior conviction. Thus, the rules permit jurors to conclude that the
accused is an evil person based on mere allegationsof sexual assault or
child molestation that may have occurred long in the past.
Coextensive with the rules' jeopardizing the constitutionally
mandated presumption of innocence, the new rules, by causing jurors
to presume that the accused is guilty based on prior acts,
impermissibly relieve the government of proving each element of a
criminal offense of sexual assault or child molestation beyond a
reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court asserted in In re Winship, 6
the traditional and time-tested standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
221. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 490 (1978) (concluding presumption of
innocence is concept embodied in due process); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503
(1976) (noting that presumption of innocence is basic component of fair trial under
American system of criminal justice); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that propensity evidence jeopardizes
presumption of innocence); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The
principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of
the administration of our criminal law."); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044
(5th Cir. 1977) (discussing bar on propensity evidence as concomitant to presumption
of innocence).
222. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
223. Id. at 479, 490. Taylor thus demands that courts not ignore certain fundamental
principles.
224. See Reuben, supra note 50, at 21 (reporting on judges' concerns over
constitutionality, inconvenience, and fundamental fairness of new rules).
225. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, (1948); see also United States v.
Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting risk that jury will characterize accused
as "evil person"); Bryden & Park, supra note 70, at 565; Liebman, supra note 6, at 754.
226. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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doubt" governs criminal trials and must be part of criminal jury
instructions even though it is not explicitly set out in the
Constitution. 227 The reasonable doubt concept "dates at least from our
early years as a Nation" and "[t]he 'demand for a higher degree of
persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient
times, [though] its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798. ' ' ' 228 While
individual states are free to define the reasonable doubt concept
somewhat differently, 29 they are not free to dispense with it when the
prosecutor's burden is explained to the jury. Thus, the Due Process
Clause defines the floor below which neither a court, legislature, nor
prosecutor may proceed without reversal.
Rules 413-415 violate the fundamental due process principles
prohibiting presumptions that relieve the prosecution of its burden of
persuasion or proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every
element of an offense. 230 The rules require admission of prior rapes
and child molestation. Such evidence will cause the jury to presume
that the accused committed the crime charged based on prior similar
offenses.23 ' It should be noted that it is constitutionally irrelevant
whether the rules are viewed as merely creating an inference as
opposed to a presumption. A permissive inference is in violation of
the Due Process Clause when "the suggested conclusion is not one that
reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the
jury., 232 Repulsed by the evidence of prior sexual assault or child
molestation offenses, the jury will overlook weaknesses in the
prosecution's case in order to punish the accused for the prior
offenses. 233 Thus, the rules unconstitutionally relieve the government

227. Id. at 361-62.
228. Id. (quoting CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 321, at 681-82 (1954)).
229. Compare Commonwealth v. Jones, 602 A.2d 820, 823 (Pa. 1992) (permitting
trial court discretion in defining reasonable doubt in instructions) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1096 (West Supp. 1996) (statutorily defining reasonable doubt as "that state of the
case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of
the truth of the charge.").
230. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 520-23 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1992) (asserting
that jurors will likely convict on belief that accused is evil).
232. Francis,471 U.S. at 314-15.
233. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task, supra note 72, at 288.
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of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of
the crime charged. 2
Finally, the rules prohibit a fundamentally fair trial because they
essentially criminalize a person's status. The axiom of fundamental
fairness embedded in the Due Process Clause is that an accused need
only answer for the crime charged. The United States Supreme Court
reinforced this principle by holding, in Robinson v. California,235 that
the Constitution prohibits legislatures, including Congress, from
criminalizing a person's status. 36 By mandating admission of
propensity evidence, Rules 413-415 prompt argument to jurors that
they should convict because the accused is a sex offender. In essence,
this allows the jury to consider the accused's status as a rapist or child
molester in its determination of guilt. 237 Thus, in direct contravention
of the Due Process Clause, Congress has impermissibly criminalized
the status of a former rapist or child molester.238
D. Lower Courts Hold That Admission of Propensity Evidence
in Trials Involving Sexual Assault and Child Molestation
Violates Due Process
Although the United States Supreme Court has never expressly so
concluded,239 several courts of appeals have held that admission of
propensity evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases in
order to show action in conformity with a character trait violates due
234. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 78 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (asserting principles underlying due process prohibit presumptions
relieving government of burden of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt on every
element of offense).
235. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
236. Id. at 667 (holding unconstitutional a California statute that criminalized being
addicted to the use of narcotics instead of the use, sale, possession, or purchase of
narcotics).
237. Cf. Edward J. lmwinkelried & Miguel A. Mendez, Resurrecting California's Old
Law on Character Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005 (1992) (asserting that the Constitution
forbids punishing a person for drug addict status).
238. See A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 55, at 351 (asserting
that admission of propensity evidence in sexual offense cases implicates constitutional
ban against criminalizing status); see also Norman M. Garland, Some Thoughts on the
Sexual Misconduct Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
355, 356 n.10 (1995) (suspecting same).
239. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (declining to reach issue of
whether admitting propensity violates due process); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,
572-74 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that while the Court has never
held that use of prior convictions to show propensity violates due process, the Court's
decisions have suggested that it does). See also supra notes 97-108 and accompanying
text (discussing Supreme Court decisions that imply that admission of propensity
evidence in fact violates due process).
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process. State courts have similarly excluded propensity evidence in
sexual assault cases.l2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in
Lovely v. United States,
was one of the first courts to reject
admission of propensity evidence in a sexual assault case. In Lovely,
the defendant was accused of raping a victim on federal land.242 The
district court permitted the government, over defense counsel's
objection, to proffer evidence that the defendant had raped another
woman on the same federal land fifteen days before the rape for which
the defendant was charged. 43 The Fourth Circuit held that admission
of the prior acts evidence was reversible error.2 4 The court indicated
that the defendant
received a fundamentally unfair trial in violation of
24
due process:

240. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 604 So. 2d 1272, 1272-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (excluding evidence of prior rape); Reichard v. State, 510 N.E.2d 163, 165-66
(Ind. 1987) (holding trial court erred in admitting propensity evidence of prior rapes);
Brown v. State, 459 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. 1984) (concluding trial court committed
reversible error by admitting testimony regarding other rapes committed by accused);
People v. Sanza, 509 N.Y.S.2d 311, 314-15 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (determining
evidence that accused previously raped three individuals was inadmissible); White v.
Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (holding evidence of prior
sexual assault inadmissible), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Lavinder v.
Commonwealth, 407 S.E.2d 910 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Satarelli, 655 P.2d 697,
700-01 (Wash. 1982) (concluding trial court should have excluded evidence of prior rape
by defendant charged with acquaintance rape).
Although Rules 413-415 are only relevant with respect to federal trials involving
sexual assault and child molestation, one of the primary purposes of the rules, according
to the rules' proponents, is to encourage states to import the new rules into their
evidence codes. See 140 CONG. REC. S10,276 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Dole). The overarching ramification, then, is that not only will the rules violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but also the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the states' adoption of the new rules will contravene
the ban on propensity evidence in thirty-eight states' evidence codes and the common
law precedents in the remaining twelve states and the District of Columbia. See supra
notes 145 and 147 (list of states' statutory and common law proscriptions against using
propensity evidence in order to show action in conformity with a particular character
trait); see also Duane, supra note 9, at 105 (suggesting that it is the "height of arrogance
for Congress to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence" in order to "teach" the states how
to properly amend their evidence codes to permit admission of propensity evidence in
cases involving sexual assault and child molestation where such offenses are typically
tried).
241. 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948).
242. Id. at 387-88.
243. Id. at 388.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 573-74 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting) (asserting that Lovely suggested that evidence of prior crimes introduced for
no purpose other than to show criminal disposition violates due process). In Lovely,
the court appeared to apply the historical test for determining what constitutes due
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The rule which thus forbids the introduction of evidence of
other offenses having no reasonable tendency to prove the
crime charged, except in so far as they may establish a criminal
tendency on the part of the accused . . . arises out of the
fundamental demand for justice and fairness which lies at the
basis of our jurisprudence. If such evidence were allowed . . .
persons accused of crime [sic] would be greatly prejudiced.24 6

Recently, several other courts of appeals have expressly held that
admitting evidence of prior acts of sexual assault and child molestation
in cases involving sexual assault and child molestation violates due
process. For example, in Henry v. Estelle,247 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that admission of highly
prejudicial, extrinsic, child molestation evidence, which charged the
courtroom atmosphere emotionally, denied the accused due process. 48
In Henry, the defendant was accused of child molestation. 249 The trial
court admitted evidence of an uncharged prior act of child molestation
allegedly committed by the accused.'
The Ninth Circuit held that
admission of the propensity evidence denied the accused due
process.25' The court commented that admission of prior acts evidence
violates due process if the jury cannot draw any permissible inference
from the evidence and the evidence prevents a fair trial.252 The court
determined that the propensity evidence was not probative of any
material issue in the case, and the only inference the jury could have
drawn was that the accused was of depraved character who had the

process. Lovely, 169 F.2d at 388-91. In so doing, the court remarked as to the
proscription against admitting propensity evidence to show action in conformity with a
particular character trait. Id. at 389 (citing People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293 (N.Y.
1901)); see also supra note 87 (discussing Molineux).
246. Lovely, 169 F.2d at 389 (emphasis added).
247. 33 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Duncan v.
Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995). The Supreme Court in Duncan held that the habeas
petitioner had failed to exhaust, in state court, his claim that the state trial court's
admitting propensity evidence denied him due process of law. Duncan, 115 S. Ct. at
888. The Ninth Circuit, in Henry v. Estelle, 52 F.3d 809, 809 (9th Cir. 1995),
subsequently vacated its prior decision based on the Supreme Court's reversal. Id.
However, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed the Ninth Circuit's
earlier conclusion that admission of propensity evidence in a child molestation case
violates an accused's right to due process. Accordingly, neither court implicated the
Ninth's Circuit's imprimatur on the argument that admission of propensity evidence in
child molestation cases violates due process.
248. Henry, 33 F.3d at 1042-43.
249. Id. at 1038.
250. Id. at 1039.
251. Id. at 1042-43.
252. Id. at 1042.
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disposition to molest children.25 3 The court remarked that such an
inference is impermissible.2
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has held that admission of propensity evidence in sexual assault and
child molestation cases violates due process. In United States v. Has
No Horse,2 " the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse
of an eleven-year-old girl in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) 256 and
sexual abuse of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a).2 57 The
district court permitted the government to proffer testimony through
two other young girls that the defendant had made sexual advances
toward them.25 8 The Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant's
conviction, concluding that admission of the other crimes evidence
prejudiced his right to a fair trial. 259 The court noted that the admitted
propensity evidence was not relevant to intent, knowledge, or common
scheme or plan, and was impermissibly relevant only to show the
defendant had the disposition to commit the crimes charged. 26°
In United States v. Fawbush,26' the defendant was charged with
aggravated sexual abuse in violation of federal law.26 2 At trial, the
district court permitted the government to call the accused's two adult
daughters who testified that the accused had sexually abused them as
children, impregnating one at the age of fifteen. 263 The Eighth Circuit
reversed the conviction. 264 The court determined that admitting the
testimony regarding the father's prior sexual abuse of his daughters
was highly inflammatory. 265 The court stated that the significant
prejudice against the defendant which resulted from admission of the
propensity evidence outweighed its probative value.26 6 The court

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 11 F.3d 104 (8th Cir. 1993).
256. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting sexual act with person
under 12 years of age).
257. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2243 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting sexual act with minor
between ages of 12 and 15, where defendant is at least 4 years older than minor).
258. Has No Horse, 11 F.3d 105.
259. Id. at 105-06.
260. Id. at 106.
261. 900 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990).
262. Id. at 150.
263. Id. at 151.
264. Id. at 152.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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commented that the proffered evidence
diverted the jury's attention
267
from the material issues in the trial.
Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently held that admission of propensity evidence in sexual offense
cases violates due process.268 In Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Archibald,269 the accused was convicted of aggravated rape.27 0 At the
accused's trial, the district court had permitted evidence that the
accused had committed a prior rape. 27 ' The Third Circuit held that the
propensity evidence was extremely prejudicial and should have been
excluded. 72 The court reasoned that it was highly likely that the jury
had drawn an improper character inference from the proffered
propensity evidence.273 The court commented that the prior acts
evidence was not probative of any material issue in the case except to
prove disposition to commit the offense charged. 4
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the centuries-old prohibition against propensity
evidence and the likelihood that they violate due process, Congress
myopically promulgated Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and
415.275 As demonstrated above, the new rules violate due process by
267. Id.
268 See also Government of Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1992).
In Pinney, the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape. Id. at 913. At the

defendant's trial, the court permitted the government to introduce evidence through the
victim's sister that the defendant had raped her six years earlier. Id. at 914. The trial
court instructed the jurors that they could not consider such as evidence as proof that the
defendant was a bad person of depraved character. Id. at 915. The Third Circuit held that
the propensity evidence was not admissible. Id. at 916. The court commented that
notwithstanding the trial judge's instruction, "courts must take a realistic view of the
capabilities of the human mind and must, therefore, acknowledge that there are
situations in which the risk that jurors will not follow the court's instructions is
unacceptably high." Id. at 918. The court implied that the propensity evidence was so
significant that the defendant's trial had been fundamentally tainted. Id. at 917-18.
269. 987 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1993).
270. Id. at 182.
271. Id. at 183. The evidence consisted of testimony by the victim's mother who
testified that the accused had fathered the child of the victim's sister. Id. The victim's
sister gave birth to the child at the age of fifteen, thus revealing that the accused had
sexual intercourse with the victim's sister when she was thirteen or fourteen years old.
Id. Under Virgin Islands law, the accused's sexual intercourse with a thirteen or fourteen
year old constituted third degree statutory rape. Id.
272. Id. at 186-87.
273. Id. at 185-87.
274. Id. at 185.
275. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. art. IV
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contravening the historically grounded and fundamental prohibition of
propensity evidence. The rules require irrational and arbitrary
inferences, and they will prevent fair trials.
Although similar rules had been previously proposed by several
members of Congress

276

and commentators, 277 many in the legal

community argued that such rules violate due process 278 by
contravening a fundamental conception of justice developed in AngloAmerican

jurisprudence. 279

These opponents included legal

organizations such as the ABA, 280 as well as a majority of judges, law
professors, and lawyers, many of whom opposed Rules 413-415 on
grounds that the rules violated due process. 21' The Federal Rules of
Evidence have been seriously undermined by Congress's hasty
incursion into an area where traditional modes of judicial interpretation
and scholarship have worked extremely well. The Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee has well served the cause of
evidence reform. It has come to treat the "Rules" as an important body
of law not to be trifled with because of political and legislative whim.
The Committee has cautiously and infrequently amended the rules.282
When amendments have been made, they followed serious study
and/or suggestions of the Supreme Court. Rules 413-415 represent
popular political fads, as do recent legislative actions such as Megan's

Rules of Evidence 413, 414, 415 (1994)) (effective July 9, 1995).
276. See supra note 27 for earlier proposals of Rules 413-415.
277. See generally Sara Sun Beale, PriorSimilar Acts in Prosecutionsfor Rape and
Child Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F. 307 (1993); Bryden & Park, supra note 70; Chris Hutton,
Comment, PriorBad Acts Evidence in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 604 (1989); David J. Kaloyanides, The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An
Example of Propensity for Aberrant Application of the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1297 (1992); John E.B. Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in
Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 479 (1988); Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol
Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 127 (1993).
278. But see Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character
Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
271 (1995) (asserting that evidence of prior bad acts of nonconsensual sexual assault
should be admissible when the defendant raises a consent defense to sexual assault

charges).
279. See supra Part II (discussing the constitutional status of the proscription against
admission of propensity evidence).
280. See A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section Report, supra note 55, at 347.
281. See Reuben, supra note 50, at 21; Woo, supra note 51, at B8.
282. See Raeder, supra note 12, at 344-45; Leonard, supra note 6, at 305.
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Law, 83 "three strikes you're out" statutes,284 death sentences for drug
dealers,285 and other political panaceas for the "crime problem." These
are often enacted with little or no regard for the Constitution and other
important rules of law. Many legislators act irresponsibly in order to
satisfy the fears of constituents. Each election presents a tidal wave of
fad legislation thrown against the bulwark of legal protection created
by the Constitution, serious legislators, judges, and scholars. It
remains to be seen if the American people will remain secure against
these constant erosions. The courts will soon provide the answer.

283. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 7-1 to 11 (West Supp. 1995) (codifying Megan's Law
which mandates that released sexual offenders notify the community via registration as a
sex offender).
284. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (mandating life imprisonment
for conviction of serious, violent felony if person has previously been convicted of two
or more serious, violent felonies).
285. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)(1994) (mandating death penalty for "Drug
Kingpins").

